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ANTITRUST LAW
where none exists. Thus, if Congress intends to allow contri-
bution, it must state its intent in definite terms before the
Court will recognize that right.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has attempted to resolve the conflict
as to whether contribution should be allowed under federal
regulatory statutes which do not expressly provide for contri-
bution. By deciding that it cannot imply a private right to
contribution unless Congress explicitly provides for one, the
Court has thrown the ball into Congress' court. Congress must
now evaluate the equity and policy factors and determine
whether violators of federal regulatory statutes should be enti-
tled to contribution. Whatever the outcome when and if Con-
gress makes that determination, it is unlikely that the Su-
preme Court, as presently composed, will interfere.
MARNA M. TEss-MATTNER
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Fifth Amendment - Re-
quested Instruction on Failure to Testify Required.
Carter v. Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. 1112 (1981). The fifth
amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."' In Carter
v. Kentucky,2 the United States Supreme Court held that
upon a defendant's request a trial judge must instruct the jury
that it should not infer guilt from the defendant's failure to
testify. The Court based its decision in part upon Griffin. v.
California,3 in which it had held that the fifth amendment
forbids adverse comment to the jury on a defendant's refusal
to testify. The Griffin Court found that such adverse comment
is an unacceptable "penalty imposed by courts for exercising a
constitutional privilege."'4 In Carter, the Court held that fail-
ure to give a requested "no adverse inference" instruction is a
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V
2. 101 S. Ct. 1112 (1981).
3. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
4. Id. at 614.
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penalty just as severe as adverse comment.'
Justice Powell in a concurring opinion, and Justice Rehn-
quist in dissent,7 criticized the Court's use of Griffin as prece-
dent, claiming that the case had far exceeded the language
and purpose of the self-mcrimiation clause. The Carter ma-
jority, however, in following the Griffin penalty analysis, rec-
ognized that protective jury instructions are critical in light of
the fifth amendment privilege.' If a trial judge penalizes a de-
fendant by refusing to give a requested "no adverse inference"
instruction, jurors may infer guilt from the defendant's failure
to testify.9
The defendant in Carter was indicted for third degree bur-
glary 10 After the state had rested, the trial judge held a con-
ference with the defendant and counsel to discover whether
the defendant would testify. The judge and defense counsel
informed the defendant that if he testified, the prosecutor
could use his prior felony convictions to impeach his credibil-
ity.11 In a private conference, counsel advised Carter that if he
testified he would be impeached, but that if he did not testify
the jury would probably hold that failure to testify against
him. Carter chose not to testify. The defense requested and
the trial court refused to give the following jury instruction:
"The defendant is not compelled to testify and the fact that
he does not cannot be used as an inference of guilt and should
not prejudice him in any way."' 12 The jury found the defend-
ant guilty and recommended a two year sentence. At the re-
cidivist phase of the trial, the defendant was found to be a
persistent felony offender," and was sentenced to the maxi-
5. Carter v. Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. 1112, 1119 (1981).
6. Id. at 1122-23 (Powell, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 1123-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 1120.
9. Id.
10. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 511.040(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1978) (amended 1980) pro-
vided that "[a] person is guilty of burglary m the third degree when, with the intent
to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in an uninhabited
building."
11. 101 S. Ct. 1112, 1115 (1981). Impeachment by prior convictions does not con-
stitute a denial of the right to testify. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215
(1971).
12. 101 S. Ct. at 1116.
13. Ky. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980).
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mum term of 20 years m prison.14
The Kentucky Supreme Court upheld Carter's convic-
tion.15 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider Carter's argument that a defendant, upon request,
has a right to a "no adverse inference" instruction under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.16 Holding that a defendant
has a right to the requested instruction, the Supreme Court
reversed Carter's conviction and remanded the case back to
the Kentucky Supreme Court.1 7
I. BACKGROUND
Shortly after ruling in Malloy v. Hogan18 that the fifth
amendment privilege applies to the states through the four-
teenth amendment, the Supreme Court held that the fifth
amendment forbids adverse comment on the accused's failure
to testify The defendant in Griffin v. California"" was con-
victed of first degree murder and sentenced to death. At trial,
he chose not to testify on the issue of guilt. The trial court"0
and the prosecution 21 urged the jury to draw inferences unfa-
vorable to the defendant because the defendant had not testi-
fied. The Court set aside Griffin's conviction because the trial
14. 101 S. Ct. at 1116.
15. The memorandum decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court, Carter v. Com-
monwealth, 598 S.W.2d 763 (1980), is unpublished.
16. Kentucky is one of only five states that prohibits giving such an instruction to
the jury. Carter v. Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. 1112, 1114 n.2 (1981). Most states require
that a request for a "no adverse inference" instruction be honored. Id.
17. Id. at 1122.
18. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Holding that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment, the Malloy
Court noted that the American system of justice is "accusatorial, not inquisitorial"
and that the fifth amendment is that system's "essential mainstay." 378 U.S. at 7
(citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961)). The Court added in Malloy
that the fourteenth amendment guarantees the right of a person to remain silent un-
less he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no
penalty for that silence. 378 U.S. at 8.
At common law, before the time of the Malloy decision, a defendant could not be
compelled to testify; neither was the defendant permitted to testify. Following the
enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1969), which provides that a defendant "shall, at his
own request, be a competent witness," the states passed laws ruling the defendant
competent to testify. For the historical development of the fifth amendment privilege,
see L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968).
19. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
20. Id. at 609-10.
21. Id. at 610-11.
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court and the prosecution had violated the defendant's consti-
tutional rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments by
commenting on his failure to testify 22
Justice Douglas, speaking for the seven-member majority,
said that "comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of
the 'inquisitorial system of criminal justice.' ,,23 The Court
further described California's rule24 which allowed such com-
ment as "a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a consti-
tutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its
assertion costly ,,25 Therefore, the Griffin Court held that the
fifth amendment forbids comment by the prosecution on the
accused's silence and instructions by the court that such si-
lence is evidence of guilt.26
Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
White, challenged the majority's holding by focusing on the
language of the fifth amendment privilege. Justice Stewart,
who wrote the majority opinion in Carter, argued in Griffin
that the defendant was not compelled to testify by the ad-
verse comment. He stated that "whatever compulsion may ex-
ist derives from the defendant's choice not to testify, not from
any comment by the court or counsel. ' 27 The dissent noted
that comment does not compel testimony by making the jury
aware of the defendant's choice not to testify, because the
jury will realize that choice even if it goes unmentioned; 28
moreover, any claimed compulsion due to comment on the ac-
cused's failure to testify was a "far cry"29 from the compulsion
that existed in the days when an accused was tortured, ban-
ished, or imprisoned if he or she did not testify.30 The defen-
dant in Griffin, the dissent concluded, was at no more of a
22. Id. at 615.
23. Id. at 614.
24. California's rule allowing such comment was based on a state constitutional
provision, now repealed, which stated that "in any criminal case, whether the defend-
ant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or
facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel,
and may be considered by the court or the jury." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (1934)
(repealed 1974).
25. 380 U.S. at 614.
26. Id. at 615.
27. Id. at 620 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 621.




disadvantage under California's comment rule than he would
have been in a court which permitted no comment at all."x
The Griffin dissent stands as a statement against expan-
sion of the fifth amendment privilege and the concept of com-
pulsion. In Carter, Justice Powell in a concurring opinion,"
and Justice Rehnquist in dissent, 3 turned to the Griffin dis-
sent in their analysis of the concept of compulsion; they
claimed that failure to give a requested "no adverse infer-
ence" instruction has nothing to do with compulsion to tes-
tify. However, Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority in
Carter, did not follow the restrictive approach to compulsion
enunciated in his Griffin dissent. In Carter, Justice Stewart
turned to the precedent and the rationale of the Griffin ma-
jority, that courts may not "[cut] down on the privilege [to
remain silent] by making its assertion costly,"3 4 and con-
cluded that a defendant has a constitutional right to a re-
quested protective jury instruction on the privilege.35
In Lakeside v. Oregon,"6 the major case following Griffin
and preceding Carter on the subject of the fifth amendment
and related jury instructions, the trial judge gave such a pro-
tective instruction over defense counsel's objection. The trial
court instructed the jury that the defendant's choice not to
testify gave rise to no inference of guilt. 7 The defendant ar-
gued that the instruction infringed upon his constitutional
privilege not to testify, relying on Grzffin's holding that the
Constitution forbids comment by the court on the accused's
silence.38 Justice Stewart, speaking for the six-member major-
ity, rejected the defendant's argument, stating that an in-
struction that the jury must draw no adverse inferences from
the defendant's failure to testify is comment entirely different
from the adverse comment held unconstitutional in Griffin.
The "no adverse inference" instruction did not encourage the
jury to draw adverse inferences from the defendant's silence,
31. Id. at 621.
32. Carter v. Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. 1112, 1122-23 (Powell, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 1123-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
34. 380 U.S. at 614.
35. 101 S. Ct. at 1119 (1981). See the text accompanying note 46 infra.
36. 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
37. Id. at 335.
38. Id. at 338.
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as in Griffin. Rather, the instruction benefitted the accused
because the jury was told to remove any unspoken mfer-
ences.39 Since the "no adverse inference" instruction benefit-
ted the accused, the defense could hardly argue that giving
this instruction compelled the defendant to testify The Lake-
side Court thus held that giving such an instruction over the
defendant's objection did not violate the fifth amendment. 0
II. THE CARTER DECISION
The Carter Court reviewed prior case law in concluding
that a defendant has a constitutional right to a requested "no
adverse inference" instruction. First, the Court followed Lake-
side in rejecting Kentucky's claim that giving the requested
"no adverse inference" instruction would have been adverse
comment by the court under Griffin, because it would have
emphasized the accused's failure to testify. The Court stated
that a "no adverse inference" instruction would have benefit-
ted the accused and would not have been comment by the
court of the sort forbidden in Griffin." Second, the Court re-
fused to hear Kentucky's claim that, in view of the over-
whelming evidence against the defendant, failure to give the
requested instruction was at most harmless error under Chap-
man v. California.42 In dismissing the harmless error claim,
39. 435 U.S. at 340. However, Justice Stevens took issue with the majority's clam
that the "no adverse inference" instruction benefits the accused.
In some trials, the defendant's silence will be like "the sun shining with full
blaze on the open eye." State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298, 301 (1871). But in other
trials - perhaps when the whole story has been told by other witnesses or
when the prosecutor's case is especially weak - the jury may not focus on the
defendant's failure to testify. For the judge or prosecutor to call it to the jury's
attention has an undeniably adverse effect on the defendant.
Id. at 345 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For further discussion of whether Lakeside is in-
consistent with the Griffin rule against adverse comment, see 62 MARQ. L. RE V. 74
(1978).
40. 435 U.S. at 340-41. The Court noted, however, that "it may be wise for a trial
judge not to give such a cautionary instruction over a defendant's objection." Id. at
340. Justice Stevens in a brief concurrence in Carter, joined by Justice Brennan, also
noted that the defendant should decide whether such an instruction should be given.
Justice Stevens stated that the Court's holding that a defendant has a right to such
an instruction is limited to cases where the defendant has requested the instruction.
Carter v. Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. 1112, 1123 (Stevens, J., concurring).
41. 101 S. Ct. at 1120-21.
42. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Court refused to reach Kentucky's harmless error
claim in Carter, because that issue had not been considered by the Supreme Court of
[Vol. 65:293
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because it had not been presented to the Kentucky Supreme
Court, the Court cited Bruno v. United States.43 There the
Court had held, in construing a federal statute, that failure to
give the requested "no adverse inference" instruction was
more than a mere "technical error"4 which courts might
disregard.'5
Although the Court followed Lakeside in rejecting Ken-
tucky's adverse comment claim and noted Bruno in dismissing
Kentucky's harmless error argument, Griffin stands as the
Carter Court's major precedent.46 According to Carter:
The Griffin case stands for the proposition that a defend-
ant must pay no court-imposed price for the exercise of his
constitutional privilege not to testify. The penalty was ex-
acted in Griffin by adverse comment on the defendant's si-
lence; the penalty may be just as severe when there is no
adverse comment, but when the jury is left to roam at large
with only its untutored instincts to guide it, to draw from
the defendant's silence broad inferences of guilt. Even with-
out adverse comment, the members of a jury, unless in-
structed otherwise, may well draw adverse inferences from a
defendant's silence.47
The Carter Court therefore based its decision on the Griffin
Court's approach to the fifth amendment privilege against
Kentucky. 101 S. Ct. at 1121 (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 527
(1979)).
43. 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
44. Id. at 293-94.
45. 101 S. Ct. at 1121 (citing 308 U.S. at 293). Although the Court did not reach
the harmless error issue in Carter, the Court noted that "[i]t is arguable that a re-
fusal to give such an instruction similar to the one that was requested here can never
be harmless "Id.
46. Kentucky also clmned that other instructions by the trial court and argu-
ments of defense counsel before the jury were sufficient to prevent the jury from
drawing adverse inferences from Carter's silence. The trial court had told the jury
that the defendant is presumed to be innocent. Defense counsel also told the jury
that the defendant was free to remain silent. Thus, Kentucky argued, the requested
"no adverse inference" instruction was unnecessary. The Court quickly dismissed
those arguments, stating that although the presumption of innocence and the fifth
amendment privilege are closely aligned, those two principles nevertheless serve dif-
ferent functions such that the jury can benefit from additional guidance on the fifth
amendment privilege. The Court further stated that arguments by defense counsel do
not have the effect that instruction from the trial judge on the fifth amendment
would have. 101 S. Ct. at 1120-21.
47. Id. at 1119.
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compulsory self-incrimination. In Griffin the Court decided
that adverse comment on a defendant's silence imposes a pen-
alty on the exercise of the constitutional privilege "by making
its assertion costly. '48 Failure to give a requested "no adverse
inference" instruction likewise amounted to a penalty, accord-
mg to the Carter Court, because it "exacts an impermissible
toll on the full and free exercise of the privilege. '49
Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority, did not follow
his Griffin dissent by directly confronting the language of the
fifth amendment privilege. Justice Powell in a concurring
opinion, 5° and Justice Rehnquist in dissent,51 regretted the
fact that Justice Stewart switched the focus from the language
of the Constitution to the authority of case precedent and to
the Griffin majority's "penalty" analysis. For example, Justice
Powell argued in a concurring opinion that the Carter deci-
sion was not required by the Constitution, but only by the
questionable case law of Griffin.52 Justice Powell quoted with
approval Justice Stewart's Griffin dissent to criticize the Grif-
fin Court's departure from the language and purpose of the
Constitution:
'"We must determine whether the petitioner has been 'com-
pelled . to be a witness against himself.' Compulsion is
the focus of the inquiry.
I think the Court in this case stretches the concept of
compulsion beyond all reasonable bounds, and that
whatever compulsion may exist derives from the defendant's
choice not to testify, not from any comment by court or
counsel ")53
Justice Powell stated that he would have joined Justice Stew-
art's dissent in Griffin.54 Nevertheless, Justice Powell recog-
nized that Griffin was precedent and concluded that the de-
fendant was entitled to the "no adverse inference" instruction
48. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
49. 101 S. Ct. at 1121.
50. Id. at 1122-23 (Powell, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 1123-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 1122.
53. Id. (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 620 (1967) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)).
54. Id. at 1122-23.
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which he had requested. 55
Justice Rehnquist in a dissenting opinion also disapproved
of the Carter majority's reliance on the Griffin Court's penalty
analysis. By following Grffin's proposition that a defendant
must pay no court-imposed price for choosing to remain si-
lent, the Carter majority, according to Justice Rehnquist, em-
ployed "Thomistic reasoning.. now carried from the consti-
tutional provision itself, to the Griffin case, to the present
case, and where it will stop no one can know."5
Justices Powell and Rehnquist thus criticized the Carter
majority's failure to focus on the language of the fifth amend-
ment, that no person be "compelled . . to be a witness
against himself." As Justice Rehnquist stated, "no one here
claims that the defendant was forced to take the stand or tes-
tify against himself inconsistently with the provisions of the
Fifth Amendment. ' 57 Of course, in Carter, the defendant was
not literally compelled to testify; he in fact did not testify at
all. Justice Powell claimed that a "defendant who chooses not
to testify hardly can claim that he was compelled to tes-
tlfy.' ' 58 Neither was the defendant compelled under a less lit-
eral interpretation of the right to remain silent, since he was
not coerced with physical harm, with threats of harm or with
the contempt sanction. Rather, the defendant's claim of com-
pulsion rests on the fact that the trial court imposed a penalty
for the exercise of his constitutional right to remain silent by
refusing to give the requested "no adverse inference" instruc-
tion. Justices Rehnquist and Powell, however, did not recog-
nize that such a refusal by the trial court could psychologi-
cally pressure a defendant to testify in violation of his
unconditional right to remain silent.
Rejecting the penalty analysis adopted by Griffin and fol-
lowed by the Carter majority, Justices Powell and Rehnquist
appeared to follow the Griffin dissent's emphasis on the cruel
forms of compulsion practiced centuries ago. In the Griffin
dissent, Justice Stewart suggested that the Court should com-
pare any claimed compulsion with the harsh procedures which
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1124 (dissenting opinion).
57. Id. at 1123 (dissenting opinion).
58. Id. at 1122 (concurring opinion) (emphasis m original).
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lay behind enactment of the fifth amendment, such as physi-
cal torture and incarceration, employed in the past to compel
a suspect to speak.5 9 However, it is axiomatic that compulsion
under the fifth amendment is not limited to torture and the
comtempt sanction. For example, in police interrogation cases
the Court has recognized that psychological pressure is just as
intolerable as physical abuse.00 In Carter, the defendant
claimed that the Court imposed such pressure upon him to
testify when it refused to give the requested "no adverse in-
ference" instruction. 1 In claiming that the Carter majority's
penalty analysis has nothing to do with compulsion, Justices
Powell and Rehnquist challenged the Court's long-standing
position that compulsion includes psychological pressure.
The Carter majority, however, reaffirmed that psychologi-
cal pressure to testify is within the concept of compulsion by
following Gnffin's penalty analysis.2 The penalty in Carter,
59. 380 U.S. at 620 (dissenting opinion).
60. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-69 (1966); Haynes v. Washington,
373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963).
61. Brief for Petitioner at 20-21, Carter v. Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. 1112 (1981).
62. 101 S. Ct. at 1119. Despite the Griffin rule, the Court in recent years has
found constitutional, government practices which arguably burden the defendant's
right to remain silent. In Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), the Court fol-
lowed the Griffin penalty analysis and held unconstitutional the Tennessee practice
of requiring the defendant to testify before any other defense witness, or not at all.
The Brooks Court held that the state had penalized the defendant because it had
extracted "a price for his silence by keeping him off the stand entirely unless he
chooses to testify first." 406 U.S. at 610. However, m McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183 (1971), the Court rejected the defendant's fifth amendment claim. The Mc-
Gautha Court held that a combined trial and sentencing proceeding, which forced the
defendant to testify at trial or lose the right to testify at the sentencing, did not place
an unconstitutional burden on the defendant's right to remain silent. The Court also
ruled against the defendant's fifth amendment claim in Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231 (1980). In Jenkins, the prosecutor used the defendant's failure to notify the po-
lice, in order to impeach his claim of self-defense. The dissent relied on Griffin, and
argued that the fact that the prosecutor used the defendant's failure to report to
police to impeach his trial testimony, rather than as substantive evidence, did not
reduce the burden on his pre-arrest right to remain silent. Id. at 250 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The Jenkns majority refused to apply Griffin, and stated that the "Con-
stitution does not forbid 'every government-imposed choice in the criminal process
that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights.'" 447 U.S. at
236 (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973)). For a discussion of the
Court's treatment of government practices which make costly the exercise of constitu-
tional rights, including the right to remain silent, to a trial, and to appeal, see Ayer,
The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence: Griffin v. California
After Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. REv. 841 (1980).
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according to the Court, was the inference of guilt which arose
from the defendant's failure to testify, an inference left un-
checked by the court's refusal to give the requested "no ad-
verse inference" instruction. 3 The Carter Court stated that
good reasons exist for invoking the privilege not to testify,
such as Carter's awareness that if he had testified, the prose-
cutor could have used his prior felony convictions to impeach
his credibility.6 4 The Court noted that without instructions,
jurors may assume that those who invoke the privilege are
guilty of crime.6 5 Because the trial court refused to instruct
the jury not to infer guilt from Carter's silence, the court pres-
sured Carter to testify in violation of his constitutional rights.
The Court has stated that a trial judge's influence on the jury
is of great weight and his or her "slightest word or intimation
is received with deference and may prove controlling." 6 Thus,
according to Carter, a judge's instruction that a defendant's
choice not to testify gives rise to no inference of guilt is a
"powerful tool" which a judge must employ upon proper re-
quest.6 7 In short, if a court imposes a price or penalty on a
defendant's right to remain silent, it engages in a subtle form
of psychological compulsion. The price paid in Carter was
failure to give a requested instruction which would have dis-
couraged the jury from inferring guilt from the defendant's
63. 101 S. Ct. at 1119.
64. In Carter the Court stated reasons why the self-incrimination clause was m-
cluded in the Constitution, including an unwillingness to subject the accused to the
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt, distrust of self-deprecatory state-
ments, and the realization that there are reasons unrelated to guilt or innocence for
declining to testify. 101 S. Ct. 1118-19 nn.14-15. As in Carter, the defendant may fear
that the prosecutor will use a prior conviction or convictions to impeach his or her
credibility. The defendant may be reluctant to incriminate others. The Court further
noted that,
It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely
innocent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when fac-
ing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character,
and offences charged against hun, will often confuse and embarrass him to
such a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him. It is
not every one, however honest, who would, therefore, willingly be placed on the
witness stand.
101 S. Ct. at 1119 n.15 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893)).
65. 101 S. Ct. at 1120 (citing Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1955)).
66. 101 S. Ct. at 1120 n.20 (quoting Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626
(1893)).
67. 101 S. Ct. at 1120.
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choice not to testify.
The Carter Court found the "no adverse inference" in-
struction a "powerful tool" to guide a jury away from its natu-
ral tendency to infer guilt from a defendant's silence. How-
ever, the Court has tolerated other "inference" instructions
which have a marked effect to the contrary, that is, instruc-
tions which have encouraged the jury to infer guilt from a de-
fendant's silence. Certain "inference" instructions allow the
judge to tell the jury it may infer guilt or an element of a
crime from certain proved facts."' Those instructions, which
arguably pressure the defendant to testify, have been permit-
ted in cases involving guilty knowledge and unlawful posses-
sion. For example, in Barnes v. United States,69 the trial
court told the jury that it could infer from proof of the defen-
dant's possession of stolen property "that the defendant knew
the property had been stolen. '70 Instructing the jury that it
could infer guilty knowledge from possession practically
forced the defendant to take the stand because normally the
defendant is the only one who can rebut that inference of
knowledge.71 But in Barnes, the Court rejected the defen-
dant's claim that the "inference" instruction compelled him to
testify.72
In County Court v. Allen,75 the defendants were charged
with unlawful possession of firearms. The court told the jury
it could infer posession from proof of the defendants' presence
m the car with the firearms, so long as there was "no substan-
tial evidence contradicting the conclusion flowing from that
inference. '7 4 The Court in Allen did not even discuss whether
pressure on the defendants to come forward with contra-
68. See J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED - TRIAL RIGHTS § 61
(1974). Apart from the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause, most of the de-
bate over the use of inferences has focused on the due process issue of whether infer-
ences relieve the state of its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permisswe Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92
HARv. L. REV. 1187 (1979).
69. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
70. Id. at 840 n.3. In Barnes, the trial court told the jurors that they could make
that inference, but that they were not required to do so.
71. See Note, The Meaning of Defendant's Silence, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 120, 123-24
(1966).
72. 412 U.S. at 846 (citing Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 185 (1925)).
73. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
74. Id. at 160 n.19.
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dicting evidence violated their privilege to remain silent. Al-
lowing "inference" instructions such as those in Barnes and
Allen appears inconsistent with the Carter principle that a
trial judge should use jury instructions to protect a defen-
dant's right against self-incrimination.
In Carter, the Court recognized the powerful influence the
trial judge has on the jury.75 The Court noted Grffin's rule
that a judge's adverse comment on the accused's silence vio-
lated the fifth amendment because it encouraged the jury to
infer guilt from that silence.76 The Carter Court held that a
trial judge must further discourage the jury from inferring
guilt from silence by granting the requested "no adverse infer-
ence" instruction.77 But in tolerating "inference" instructions,
such as those in Barnes and Allen, the Court has allowed the
trial judge in effect to encourage the jury to infer guilt from
silence.7 s
Of course, in unlawful possession cases and other cases
where it is probable that only the accused has facts necessary
for his or her defense, an inference of guilt from silence might
be highly rational. The trial court cannot prevent the jury
from expecting the accused to testify as to those facts. But
outside of any guilt inferred by jury members from their own
experience, the court should not use jury instructions to
futher encourage those inferences. 79 As the Court said in
Carter, "[n]o judge can prevent jurors from speculations
about why a defendant stands mute in the face of criminal
accusation, but a judge can, and must, if requested to do so,
use the unique power of the jury instruction to reduce that
75. 101 S. Ct. at 1120 n.20.
76. Id. at 1119.
77. Id. at 1121-22.
78. In such cases as Barnes and Allen, the inference directly arises from unex-
plained facts and not from the defendant's silence. However, where only the defend-
ant can explain those facts but chooses not to testify, the jury m effect is encouraged
to infer guilt from the defendant's silence. See Note, The Meaning of Defendant's
Silence, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 120, 123-24 (1966).
79. Such "inference" instructions as in Barnes and Allen no doubt help the prose-
cution prove its case. Arguably, the fact that such instructions aid the prosecution
violates the fifth amendment's principle of "fair play which dictates 'a fair state-indi-
vidual balance by requiring the government in its contest with the individual, to
shoulder the whole load' " Carter v. Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. at 1119 (quoting
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
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speculation to a minimum. "80 Carter thus stands for the prop-
osition that jury instructions must protect the defendant's
right not to testify But the Court, in Barnes and Allen, has
allowed "inference" instructions which burden that right. In
view of Carter's principle that jury instructions must protect
the defendant's right to remain silent, perhaps the Court in
the future will object to the use of "inference" instructions
which pressure the defendant to testify
III. CONCLUSION
In Carter v. Kentucky the United States Supreme Court
held that the fifth amendment requires a criminal trial judge
to give a "no adverse inference" instruction when requested
by a defendant. The Court relied on the principle set forth in
Griffin v. California; that a trial court may not penalize a de-
fendant for exercising a constitutional right. In Carter, the
Court found that the trial court penalized the defendant, who
chose not to testify, when the court refused to give the re-
quested instruction. Without the requested "no adverse infer-
ence" instruction, jurors may infer guilt from the defendant's
failure to testify The Court recognized in Carter that the trial
judge has a powerful influence on the jury Therefore, upon
the defendant's request, the judge must use that influence to
protect the defendant's privilege not to testify by instructing
the jury not to infer guilt from the defendant's silence.
The Carter decision will not cause immediate major
changes in criminal procedure because most states require
that a request for a "no adverse inference" instruction be
honored. However, the Carter Court's rationale, that the trial
judge must use the "powerful tool" of jury instructions to pro-
tect a defendant's right to remain silent, may raise questions
about the constitutionality of certain "inference" instructions.
Trial courts commonly instruct juries that they may infer an
element of the crime from proven facts. Such "inference" in-
structions may force the defendant to come forward with evi-
dence to rebut the inference. Tolerating "inference" instruc-
tions which pressure the defendant to testify appears
mconsistent with Carter's principle that jury instructions
80. 101 S. Ct. at 1120.
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should protect and not burden the defendant's right to remain
silent.
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